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Abstract 
According to the Druze notion of transmigration (taqammuṣ), whenever someone dies, his or her 
soul moves into the body of a newborn Druze of the same sex. While this makes the Druze feel 
that they belong together in a more fundamental way because they are ‘born in each other’s 
houses’ (Oppenheimer), it is more ambivalent the moment children start to ‘speak’ about previous 
lives in another family. Allowing the ‘return’ of someone lost to death and potentially bringing 
two such houses in closer relation, ‘speaking’ also requires coming to terms with conflicting 
belonging. 
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Résumé 
Selon la notion druze de transmigration (taqammuṣ), quand une personne meurt, son âme entre 
dans le corps d'un nouveau-né druze du même sexe. Bien que cela donne aux druzes le sentiment 
d'appartenir à une communauté plus fondamentale parce qu'ils sont « nés dans la maison de l'autre 
«  (Oppenheimer), la situation devient plus ambivalente quand enfants commencent à « parler » 
de leurs vies antérieures, ce qui rapproche potentiellement ces deux maisons l’une de l’autre 
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Introduction 
‘It is difficult to understand how a toddler could want to see his children.’ ‘He is my brother, and 
he is not my brother at the same time!’ ‘His grandmother is a good deal younger than him.’ ‘
Families do not want their children to belong to another family in addition to themselves.’ ‘I would 
not want to know who I was in a previous life.’ Alongside other similar statements, these were 
documented during the course of a research project focused on the Druze1 belief in taqammuṣ or 
the ‘transmigration of the souls’ / ‘rebirth.’ The above statements make sense through this idea 
that the soul migrates to a new body after death. More specifically, they reveal that in the Druze 
communities of the Middle East taqammuṣ is not just the subject matter of abstract thoughts, but 
sometimes surfaces in the form of concrete cases, which are inextricably linked to a phenomenon 
termed ‘speaking’ (nuṭq) in Arabic where children start to ‘speak’ (naṭaqa) about a previous life. 
According to Druze discourse, this ‘speaking’ must be understood as a soul remembering 
elements of its former life and often the moment of death itself. Time and again, ‘stories’ (qiṣaṣ) 
are told about ‘speaking’ children2 within the range of 2–4 years who insist that they are someone 
else, maybe want to be with another family, or talk about how they died. As a rule, their previous 
lives came to an untimely or violent end, in which accidents, murder, or diseases abound.3 It is 
part of the Druze experience of taqammuṣ that, sometimes and contingent on proof, such children 
‘re-take’ the unique place they occupied in their previous life.  
On the one hand, the notion that the soul migrates from body to body is attractive. It 
offers an answer to seeming inequalities through claiming that divine justice materializes across 
the boundaries of a single life-circuit. Or it explains that those lost to death in reality live on in 
the form of a different human being. In this context, the phenomenon of ‘speaking’ not only turns 
the central propositional content that ‘souls migrate from body to body’ into something ‘palpable 
and real’ (‘shī māddī malmūs’), but, if reflected upon, also contains all sorts of moral lessons (‘
ʿibar muʿayyane’).4 From the emic perspective, not only does each case of ‘speaking’ corroborate 
anew that people are actually reborn and make visible who is reborn as who (e.g. Druze as Druze), 
but the cases also make particularly obvious that the (divine) logic of taqammuṣ puts the things 
that matter in everyday-life into perspective, such as descent, economic interests, or rivalries over 
power (see Rivoal, 2000: 384–385). The Druze, for example, suggest that cases of ‘speaking’ do 
play a certain role in ending ‘man-made’ forms of conflict, including blood vengeance.5 It 
furthermore is not uncommon to hear that crimes were solved through ‘speaking’ children or 
reincarnated individuals in general, in the sense that, for example, a ‘speaking’ child named his 
or her murderer (see also Bennett, 1999: 113).  
On the other hand, as interviews with Druze show, the phenomenon of ‘speaking’ is is 
more ambivalent the moment it affects concrete people. To begin with, one does not know where 
it will lead to, nor who or what will reappear if the case unfurls. In line with Pierre Bourdieu’s 
observation that to reintroduce time is to reintroduce uncertainty (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 
138), ‘speaking’ initially is pervaded with uncertainty and some people are afraid of the 
threatening quality of things unknown (‘khōf min al-majhūl’). Even before it sets in, depending 
on how one is linked to the ‘speaking’ individual, ‘speaking’ may be a source of both hope and 
anxiety. More specifically, ‘speaking’ is ambivalent insofar as it promises to result in 
sociologically real relationships that link a ‘previous’ and a ‘present’ life. While this allows the 
‘return’ of someone lost to death in different bodily form, it also is associated with difficulties, 
and the latter are often reckoned with, because this way one soul may become associated with two 
known places (the previous-life and the present-life place) at the same time. Concrete human 
beings and their families may thus be cast in characteristic forms of confusion, conflict, disorder, 
and not always pleasant or desired forms of proximity. 
This article first explores the general Druze notion of transmigration and subsequently 
highlights difficulties that may arise if ‘speaking’ pushes transmigration to the level of concrete 
human beings with a unique place in the social world. 
The empirical material on which it rests has been gathered through about 25 interviews 
in Lebanon in October 2016 and in Austria among Syrian Druze refugees between April 2016 and 
February 2017.6 Apart from three Christian women who were friends with our Lebanese interview 
partners, all interview partners were (non-religious) Druze, both male and female, ranging from 
their mid-twenties to their sixties. While in two instances, the reincarnated individuals told their 
own story, in most cases, individuals told about a reincarnated relative or friend, or cases from 
their locality. In several instances, the reincarnated individuals themselves declined to be 
interviewed. The interview partners, on which this article rests, do not comprise parents of 
‘speaking’ children.7 Some families comprising a reincarnated individual knew the previous-life 
family, others did not. If relatives or friends recounted the case, they were almost all from the side 
of the reincarnated individual. Generally, people were asked to explain what taqammuṣ was, 
whether they could recount cases, and what their own ideas regarding the phenomenon were. In 
several instances, our interview partners spontaneously tried to call people they knew, and the 
cases were told with the group of friends present; at other times, only the interview partner was 
present. 
There is not a singular Druze stance on ‘speaking.’ Furthermore, ‘speaking’ may feel quite 
different depending on whether it has already taken place or led to relationships; it may be 
perceived differently throughout a person’s life and depending on whether one belongs to the 
‘speaking’ child or the person lost to death; it may be happy in one case, and not so in others; the 
social relationships established through ‘speaking’ may be both desired and a burden; etc. This 
article does not aspire to reconstruct any individual case, but seeks to construct an analytical 
framework through which this ambivalent presence may be better understood and to document 
how the ambivalent nature of the phenomenon reappears in statements of interview partners and 
to all appearances forms a part of the Druze discourse on transmigration. For this reason, it 
furthermore includes online material, in part recommended by interview partners, that attests to 
the discursive presence under scrutiny. 
This article draws on both a solid body of research about the Druze and their theological 
thought (see e.g. de Smet, 2007; Firro, 2011), as well as on important anthropological studies that 
address transmigration in a Druze context (see e.g. Oppenheimer, 1980; Bennett 1999, 2006; 
Rivoal 2000, 2016; Armanet, 2011; Kastrinou, 2016). The phenomenon of ‘speaking’ furthermore 
has been the subject of psychology (see Dwairy, 2006) as well as of research in the vein of Ian 
Stevenson (see e.g. Stevenson and Haraldsson, 2003), which in its efforts to investigate the 
objective truth of claimed previous-life memories, contributes to documenting the Druze 
discourse on ‘speaking.’ Finally, cases of ‘speaking’ have recently been addressed from the 
perspective of false memories and memory distortion (see French, 2016).  
 
Taqammuṣ 
According to the Druze notion of transmigration, the human body is tantamount to a ‘shirt’ 
(qamīṣ) that the soul (rūḥ) wears. At the moment of death, the soul immediately8 ‘puts on a new 
shirt,’ that is, it instantly moves to a new body.9 Any individual soul thus passes through an infinite 
number of bodies in which it completes successive life-circuits. The sojourn of the soul in one 
particular body equals one life-circuit, and the moment it leaves that body for the next one a new 
life-circuit begins. In local parlance, these successive life-circuits are termed ‘generations’ (ajyāl; 
sg. jīl). 
As stated explicitly in Druze scriptures, the soul cannot be a part of the world without a body (see 
also Kastrinou, 2016: 65–67). In the terminology of the Kitāb an-nuqaṭ wa-dawāʾir, it ‘manifests’ 
(ẓahara) through the body and at the same time is ‘hidden’ by the body as the ‘manifesting’ entity; 
the body is the soul’s ‘veil’ (ḥijāb) (see Seybold, 1902: 30–31).10 The notion of taqammuṣ thus, 
on the one hand, focuses on the soul’s movement from body to body, which implicitly relegates 
the body to something unessential and replaceable; on the other hand, a particular soul, which is 
essentially the same throughout all the life-circuits, is always a part of the world in the form of a 
distinct human being. 
This article contends that, if one wishes to understand the ambivalence of the 
phenomenon of ‘speaking,’ then the involved human beings must be taken seriously. In this 
respect, Luc Boltanski’s work on abortion (The Foetal Condition) offers important analytical 
tools (Boltanski, 2013: 27–59). According to Boltanski, a human being takes his or her place in 
society both because he or she has (1) membership within categories, and (2) a personal identity 
without any possibility of being confused with another, i.e., a human being is susceptible both to 
arrangement in classes and to singularization (Boltanski, 2013: 29). If, according to the Druze 
outlook, a soul transmigrates, it thus not only moves from manifesting as one human being, who 
has membership in different categories that grasp him or her at every turn to manifesting as 
another human being for whom holds true exactly the same, but it also moves from occupying 
one singular place in one familial group to occupying another singular place in (mostly) another 
familial group. Because each life-circuit of the soul is associated with a singular place in a familial 
group, the migration of the soul thus runs across the boundaries of individual Druze familial 
groups, and the conflicting logics of taqammuṣ (‘soul’) and descent (‘blood’) produce the effect 
that people are ‘born in each other’s houses’ (see Oppenheimer, 1980).11 Nonetheless, in each 
life-circuit, the soul manifests as a distinct human being, which belongs to some particular familial 
group, is loved by them, and so forth. 
 
According to the Druze world-view, normally the soul does not remember its previous 
life – at least not to the extent that this would be reflected at the level of speech.12 The different 
families, in which the same soul has manifested in the form of a concrete human being, normally 
do not know each other.13 As long as this does not change, the notion of transmigration mainly 
raises questions concerning an individual’s membership in his or her ethnic-religious and sex 
group. More specifically, a Druze soul is thought to move to a Druze body of the same sex (see 
Nigst, 2017).14 Against the backdrop of endogamy, this produces an important ideological and 
unifying effect of establishing the notion of a ‘soul’-based form of relatedness for all members of 
the Druze collective (Armanet, 2011: 210–215). But what happens if children do remember a 
previous life and two singular places exert their pull? 
 
Porous boundaries  
According to the Druze world-view, the boundary of oblivion, which normally separates two life-
circuits of a soul, sometimes becomes porous and children start to ‘speak.’ It is common Druze 
knowledge that the phenomenon often starts off with protests on the part of the ‘speaking’ child 
about being misplaced (see Bennett, 1999: 88).  
On the one hand, ‘speaking’ children are stated to reject their proper name, deny that their 
parents are really their parents, and claim that they are someone else. People tell about children 
who are upset, cry, or tell their families that they do not like them, often claiming that the house 
where they currently reside is not their house. Additionally, these children also often offer 
memories of how their own previous lives ended, such as a fatal accident, or providing even the 
name of the person who murdered them.  
On the other hand, the feeling of being misplaced also concerns the categories in which 
the child is a member (see Nigst, 2017: 66). Most common in this context are the age categories 
(see Stevenson and Haraldsson 2003: 286), most likely because re-birth implies a return to the 
category of ‘child’ and regularly shifts previous-life ‘adults’ to present-life ‘children.’15 For 
example, interview partners sometimes state that ‘speaking’ children who passed away as adults 
find it annoying to be treated like children again. They reportedly protest against being forced to 
wear children’s clothing or are furious about perceived unseemly treatment, such as being 
reprimanded in public (see Laṭīf, 2014: 194). A recurring element in this context is the demand 
of ‘speaking’ children to see their previous-life husband or wife. Considering that many people 
who passed away were parents, it makes sense that ‘speaking’ children often want to ‘see their 
children.’ Furthermore, cases often show something odd and decidedly ‘un-childlike’ about the 
way they speak; or the language they use and their tone16 suggests the child to be an adult (see 
also Laṭīf, 2014: 265; 275). The notion of being in the presence of a child who is not really a child 
occurs: ‘To me, he is an adult playing a child.’17 Or: ‘There is something older’ than the child 
‘that is speaking’ (‘fī shī akbar minno ʿam yiḥkī’).18 There are skills one would not expect from 
someone of their age19 and children who prefer being in the presence of adults. Not least, in this 
context, there are cases of inexplicable linguistic skills (‘xenoglossy’).  
Misplacement and similar dissatisfaction furthermore may appear in respect to socio-
economic status, and the ‘speaking’ child may, for example, indicate that the present, lesser status 
does not befit him or her (see Abū Shaqrā, 2016). Misplacement in respect to ethnic-religious or 
confessional belonging and the sex or gender categories, however, is extremely rare or totally 
absent. Thus, despite sometimes being met with critique20 and despite more universalistic 
outlooks on taqammuṣ, the idea is prevalent that Druze men are always reborn as Druze men, and 
Druze women as Druze women (‘titqammaṣ min Dirzī la-Dirzī’), and the potentially subversive 
character of taqammuṣ, as far as the ethnic-religious boundaries are concerned, is kept at a 
minimum, if not explicitly denied see Nigst, 2017: 63–64).21 This reflects the general Druze 
conviction that the Druze collective consists of the same souls that sincerely joined the Druze in 
the 11th century AD (see Rivoal, 2000: 32). In fact, it seems that the idea that transmigration takes 
place in accordance with the ethnic-religious boundaries is challenged mostly at the discursive 
level and when individual people try to readjust taqammuṣ with other convictions they may hold 
such as communism or a world-view oriented towards the natural sciences (see Nigst, 2017: 75). 
As regards the concrete cases that happen in one’s own environment, they virtually all corroborate 
that Druze are reborn as Druze. 
 
When the unknown becomes potentially knowable 
While some people might interpret a child’s ‘speaking’ as nonsense (‘turrahāt’), others believe 
that it can open a window through which a previous life may find its way back into the present. 
Apart from explaining phobias or predilections,22 people do reckon with the possibility that the 
words of the child may actually lead back to the familial group with which his or her soul was 
previously associated, that is, the previous-life personal identity may become known. Thus 
possibly establishing relations between two otherwise unrelated families,23 instances of 
‘speaking’ may have ‘concrete social effects both on families and communities’ (Bennett, 1999: 
79). Analytically speaking, there are three degrees to which a ‘speaking’ child is allowed to break 
through to the level of concrete ‘previous-life’ people in the social world. First, the previous-life 
family may be met, and, contingent on proof, which includes both the child’s ability to name the 
previous-life family members and particular episodic memories, the ‘speaking’ child may ‘re-
take’ his or her previous place. 24 In this case, the soul indeed has moved on to a new unique place, 
but is allowed an additional space and context where everything is as if it had not and to which it 
‘returns’ in different bodily form. This form of re-taking may translate into fulfilling relationships 
and mutual visits between present-life and previous-life families of the reborn individual, the 
involvement of him or her in rites (see e.g. Stemman, 2012: 34), and potentially he or she 
receiving ‘inheritance’ or financial support from the previous-life family. The extent to which that 
happens, if at all, varies and the resulting relationships may change over time. Second, ‘speaking’ 
may reach into the level of real people in the social world only to a lesser extent. One may, for 
example, know who the previous-life family are, but shy away from taking the final step and 
knock on their door.25 Third, efforts to thwart the relationship-forming force of ‘speaking’ before 
it takes any effect are common for dealing with the ‘speaking’ of a child.  
According to our interview partners, whether an individual case of ‘speaking’ unfolds to 
a level where it involves ‘previous-life’ people may be due to a conscious effort or product of 
random circumstances; it may be wanted or not; it may be wanted by both families, or only one 
of them. Sometimes ‘speaking’ children give information specific enough to lead back to concrete 
human beings and families. It seems that some families of ‘speaking’ children make substantial 
efforts to identify the previous-life family of which their child ‘speaks.’ They keep asking around 
and their quest may lead them from village to village. Other times the family of the passed-away 
individual actively starts to look for cases of ‘speaking’ that could match their lost relative and 
visits the family of the ‘speaking’ child as soon as knowledge of his or her case has started to 
spread (Iklimos, 2012). Alternatively, children might stumble across their previous-life, or their 
previous-life relatives, by chance (‘bi-ṣ-ṣudfe’)26 – something which may also happen later in life. 
The latter is quite common and, according to our interview partners, this makes sense because the 
memories of a previous life are often sparked through the confrontation with things that either are 
from the old life or resemble it.27 ‘Speaking’ does not, however, necessarily lead to the 
establishment of a taqammuṣ-based relation between two families. This may be due to 
circumstances or a conscious effort to thwart the relationship-forming potential of ‘speaking.’ On 
the one hand, the information may be too scarce or the names and places may not be able to be 
identified. Conversely, even if a matching passed-away individual is found, the family of that 
individual does not always show interest or the child fails to deliver ‘proof.’ On the other hand, 
the family of a ‘speaking’ child does not always tolerate possible efforts of bereaved families to 
reach out to the ‘speaking’ child. Lebanese Druze shaykh Sāmī Abī l-Munā recommends that 
families should reject such efforts and drive away those who make them (‘ishrabū finjān qahwa, 
Allāh maʿakum, khalāṣ’).28 As a final possibility, the family of the ‘speaking’ child does not 
always allow their child’s ‘speaking’ to really unfold and it gets stalled before it may actually lead 
to concrete human beings of a previous life, and the previous life ideally disappears.  
 
The encroachment of another singular place 
Sociologically speaking, both the ‘speaking’ child and the passed-away individual, 
continued to be caught in a ‘singularization process,’29 which underlies his or her personal identity 
and allows him or her to be identified individually ‘without any possibility of being confused with 
another’ (Boltanski, 2013: 28–29). Initiated long before birth and ‘involving conception, 
pregnancy, birth, integration into a social group and subsequent phases of socialization’ 
(Boltanski, 2013: 20), this process enables the ‘access, after birth, to a singular position in society’ 
(Boltanski, 2013: 49), and it will be necessary to conduct careful research into how this process 
looks like in the Druze communities. Both were born into a respective singular position that 
awaited them before birth; both were ‘taken up in a symbolic mode’ and ‘in speech’ (see Boltanski, 
2013: 37) – but not by the same people. Thus, if ‘speaking’ leads to the previous-life personal 
identity, the relation of a soul with its past factually takes on the form of a relation between two 
singular places in Druze social space, which by definition entails the perception that the soul, and 
thus the human being as which it currently manifests, not only is torn inside and struggles with 
accommodating the previous-life memories, but also is pulled into the direction of two different 
familial groups and personal identities. 
Many people are worried that ‘speaking’ will thus expose the child to contradictions and 
inconsistencies (‘tanāquḍ’). The affected individual threatens to ‘become like two personalities’ 
(‘biṣīr mithl shakhṣiyyatayn’), which is potentially detrimental to the psychological well-being of 
the ‘speaking’ child (‘khaṭīr bi-nafsiyyit il-walad’). In the light of the potential appearance of the 
family in whose fold the soul manifested in its previous life, many people are afraid of the inner 
conflict of (objectively) competing belongings (see Bennett, 1999: 103). Allowing ‘speaking’ to 
pull towards the previous life is thus tantamount to accepting the inconsistencies and difficulties 
that come along with wanting to be ‘here’ and ‘there’ at the same time, which is not considered a 
good way of growing up (‘ḥarām tikbar hēk’). Even reborn people, who may find it positive that 
they went through a ‘unique experience,’ point to the inherent ambivalence of that experience.30  
The situation furthermore may cause pain and hurt feelings, especially on the part of the present-
life family, which has to accept that the encroachment of the past may orientate their child towards 
an additional familial belonging (“You are not my mom!”). It is here that taqammuṣ is ‘ugly and 
difficult’ (‘bashiʿ w-ṣaʿb’), as a reincarnated woman in Lebanon stated recalling her own 
experience. The previous-life family may have ‘found’ a lost family member again and be happy 
about that, but the present-life family may feel to have partially ‘lost’ their child. In fact, the 
human being, which in a concrete case of ‘speaking’ is pulled towards another family and who 
from an abstract perspective simply is a transient corporeal manifestation of a soul, is a loved 
human being who belongs to particular people. Although it may sometimes be desired that 
through ‘speaking’ one’s own familial group establishes a relation with others, coming to terms 
in real-life with the consequences of one’s own child having an additional belonging is not 
necessarily easy, and be it at the most trivial level such as disagreement about who picks up the 
child from school. As a young Syrian refugee now living in Germany explained: ‘A family always 
loves its child, and they want it to belong only to them – and not to two families.’ According to 
him, especially the present-life mothers are distressed by the pull of the previous-life world on 
their child (‘dāʾiman il-imm bitḥibb ṭifla’), which may lead to the feeling that the own child has 
become someone else’s child (see Dwairy, 2006: 35) and to substantial animosities (see Iklimos, 
2012). Ambivalent feelings may develop even in cases where the previous-life and the present 
family are on good terms and where the parents encouraged the ‘speaking’ of their child and the 
identification of the previous-life family. Significantly, the impression occurs that the previous-
life family is ‘stealing’ the child (see Dwairy, 2006: 44). 
Moreover, despite allowing the ‘return’ of a person lost to death in different bodily form, 
the previous-life family may prefer if the singular position of their passed-away relative was not 
‘retaken.’ They may be afraid that they might have to give financial support to the ‘speaking’ 
child and his or her family. Even in cases where a ‘speaking’ individual is recognised, reluctance 
to support the ‘speaking’ child financially may show, and it may be rationalised, for example, by 
pointing to previous-life greediness. Unpleasant secrets may surface.31 Maybe a different body 
simply cannot be accepted for the passed-away relative. Conversely, the reborn individual might 
not want to bear the responsibilities that come along with the previous-life place. For example, a 
young man from Deir al-Qamar in Lebanon explained to us that he was afraid of such 
responsibilties. This is particularly relevant if reborn individuals by chance stumble across their 
previous life in adulthood again. Generally, fears of having to fulfil social obligations seem to be 
playing an important role in the context of cases of ‘speaking’ (see Bennett 1999: 108). Not least, 
individuals maybe later in life develop the feeling that the space of their lived body – their ‘private 
sphere’ – is being encroached upon and would have preferred to be associated only with their 
present life. Illustrative in this respect, one of our Lebanese interview partners who died from 
cancer in her early twenties in her previous life, told that her previous-life mother was extremely 
happy about having re-found her dearly loved daughter whose premature death she was still 
mourning. Yet, our interview partner was emphatically not entirely happy about the same 
situation, indicating that she for the most part had stopped visiting her previous-life mother 
because seeing her was like returning to all of the sadness over and over again, and it implied 
meeting with someone who always wanted to hug and squeeze her; who was caught in the past 
while life had moved on. 
Thus, in particular if the previous-life family recognizes the ‘speaking’ child, the resulting 
sociologically real relations may be difficult, not least emotionally. Two processes of 
singularization objectively clash and pull into opposite directions and direct the child towards 
different places and towards different names. Hence, as a notable shaykh puts it, to really let an 
individual case of ‘speaking’ unfold its full force is tantamount to entering a ‘gigantic maze’ (‘
matāha ṭawīla ʿarīḍa’).32 Whoever is willing to let that happen, risks not only that the respective 
individual gets lost between two lives and the pull of two different belongings (‘biḍīʿ il-walad;’ ‘
biʿīsh bi-ḍ-ḍayāʿ’), but also exposes everyone else involved in the case to the (emotional) 
dynamics of conflicting singular positions and the social obligations that come along with them. 
 
Hierarchies 
According to many interview partners, the previous-life and the present life should not be placed 
at the same level. The soul has ‘moved on,’ and it is the present life, which has priority. 
Significantly, they insisted that the ‘real’ name of the ‘speaking’ child is the name that pertains to 
the present life, while the previous-life name at most could be regarded and used like a ‘nickname’ 
(laqab). Evidently, the previous-life human being and the present-life human being are not simply 
the same. Our interview partners express this thought in a variety of ways, mostly referring to 
someone’s ‘old person’  and ‘new person.’ It is in the new person that someone lives. They 
explained that despite having memories of a previous life as someone else, the respective 
individual ‘thinks in a new way.’ This means that the previous-life memories are, or increasingly 
become, only a part of the self of the person involved, which in his or her present life relates to 
the world in new ways, making new memories and experiences. Lexemes pertaining to the 
semantic field of ‘thinking’ were used to express this relative autonomy of the present life. 
Different of our interview partners repeatedly stated that someone lived with a ‘new mind’ or a 
‘new brain;’ that the person’s ‘thinking’ was different. 
As an older Syrian refugee currently living in the Austrian countryside explained, the 
parents of the ‘speaking’ child clearly have the responsibility to avert the encroachment of the 
previous life on the present life of their child. This was tantamount to ‘protecting’ the life of the 
child (‘ḥārisīn ḥayāto’) so that he or she could grow up ‘undamaged’ and ‘sound’ (‘salīm’). 
According to him, the parents best prevented the previous-life personal identity, which threatens 
to reappear, from meddling with this present life, and shielded their child from being dragged into 
an alternative and competing form of belonging that has had its time (see Nigst, 2017: 76–77). 
‘Silencing’ the child, or trying to make sure that the memories do not end up establishing a 
conflicting form of belonging, seem to fulfil this function. 
 
‘Silencing’ the ‘speaking’ child 
It is plausible that people who are afraid of the negative consequences of a particular type of 
speech make an effort to turn that speech into silence: Over and over again, our interview partners 
mentioned that ‘speaking’ children were ‘silenced’ (sakkata; manaʿa min al-kalām) by their 
parents.33 The pairs ‘to remember’ (tadhakkara) / ‘to make forget’ (ansā) on the one hand, and 
‘to speak’ (naṭaqa) / ‘to silence’ (sakkata) on the other hand, are part of almost every conversation 
about the phenomenon of ‘speaking’ children.34 ‘Silencing’ the ‘speaking’ child obviously 
corresponds to the effort of containing him or her in the boundaries of his or her present-life 
personal identity and of ‘deafening’ him or her vis-à-vis the voices of the past (‘biṭarrshu’).  
This strong presence of ‘silencing’ is a good reminder that, emically speaking, nuṭq is not 
matter of choice – it just happens. This is not to say that Druze people themselves dismiss entirely 
the idea that nuṭq could be ‘fabricated’ and the child enticed into ‘speaking.’ On the contrary, they 
address not only the fact of ‘speaking’ (naṭaqa), but also the fact of ‘being made to speak’ 
(naṭṭaqa) (see also Bennett, 1999: 106–107).35 But ruling out the latter possibility, which might 
be true in some cases, ‘speaking’ is understood to be something that simply washes over people 
without them having a say. They can react differently to an instance of ‘speaking,’ but the fact 
that it occurs, is beyond the grasp of their will. In fact, many people abhor the idea of remembering 
a previous life. They are convinced that the memories of the previous life are real, but they would 
do everything they can in order to prevent them from gaining any momentum. As a young Syrian 
refugee in Austria explained: ‘If I had a child in the future who started to speak about a previous 
life, I would at once try to make him or her forget.’ According to what people say, it is, however, 
not always possible or easy to make a child forget. ‘Speaking’ children especially become 
vengeful (‘nāqim’) and difficult (‘mashkaljī’) when they feel resistance from their parents, and 
their subjective yearning for a previous place is met with unsuccessful efforts at making that 
yearning go away. Although some of our interview partners were quite stoic and insinuated that 
the situation resulting from the concrete cases was ‘no big scandal’ (‘rawāq’), people’s frequent 
emphasis that ‘silencing’ the children maybe was the best choice, seems to suggest that they 
reckon with problems and conflict in this context. Many people insist that forgetting is necessary 
(‘mafrūḍ yinsā’)  because, as a young interview partner from Lebanon whose brother had ‘spoken’ 
explained, people ‘cannot not live two lives at the same time’ The result would be confusion, and 
many families do not want the feeling of being ‘torn between two families’ (Dwairy, 2006: 40). 
Clearly, the decision to ‘silence’ a ‘speaking’ child may often also be motivated by the wish to 
have a child that behaves in an age-adequate manner. As one young Syrian interview partner 
explained, people do not want to have a ‘child who is not a child at the same time’ (‘ṭifl huwa 
mush ṭifl’). Remembering their adult selves, the affected children allegedly may not only feel 
belittled because of having suffered the loss of the social standing and respect accorded to adults, 
but also the ‘normal’ hierarchies between children and adults may end up turned upside down 
under some circumstances. For example, one Syrian refugee in his mid-fifties, who now lives in 
Vienna, told the case of a ‘speaking’ boy who in his previous life was a famous Lebanese shaykh. 
When he was a pubescent boy, people started to pay pious visits to him, which placed him in a 
considerable position of power, with the social roles of him and his father being turned upside 
down. Not least, it may be difficult to come to terms with the fact that, all of the sudden, for 
example a ‘boy’ is the ‘husband’ or ‘man’ when, according to the social construction of 
masculinity, a ‘boy’ is the exact opposite of a ‘man.’  
 
Emerging and disappearing 
According to our interview partners, the pull of the singular position of the former life is not 
necessarily constant because that position essentially has its importance and force based on the 
child remembering his or her previous life. As the child grows more familiar with his or her 
present life (‘biṣīr yitʾaqlam ijbārī’) and develops emotional ties with the new family (‘yikūn 
yitʿallaʾ bi-ʿayle jdīde’), those memories may fade away, with the wish to return to the previous 
life lessening or disappearing entirely. In fact, Druze discourse usually starts from the assumption 
that for a period the soul misses the previous life, which it had in a different body (see Armanet, 
2011: 151–152). However, after a while it starts to feel ‘at home’ in its new place. As has been 
emphasised, this place is not just a body, but also a singular position in a family. As a result, what 
according to Druze discourse corresponds to the process of the soul growing familiar with its new 
place and its losing interest in returning to the previous place, in real life translates into ‘speaking’ 
children who emerge in another familial context, but maybe also disappear from it again (see 
Nigst, 2017: 77).  
 
‘Speaking’ and the contingency of one’s own world-view 
The Druze claim that all human souls migrate, should also entail cases of ‘speaking’ that occur 
among their non-Druze or atheist neighbours. However, these types of cases are minimal, and the 
Druze are aware of that.36 In dealing with this particular form of contingency rooted in the factual 
plurality of alternative world-views (Von Stosch, 2003: 25–30), not only does wider Druze 
discourse turn to ‘worldwide evidence of reincarnation,’ but more specifically interview partners 
suggest that cases of ‘speaking’ do occur among their non-Druze or unbelieving neighbours. 
Those families, however, instantly suppress or quench the ‘speaking’ under way (‘ʿamaliyyat an-
nuṭq tuqmaʿ min huwa zghīr’). One Syrian interview partner who fled to Austria with her husband 
told about her Christian friend whose son started to talk of a previous-life as soon as he could 
speak. The Christian friend told her that she did not let her son ‘speak’and that she made sure that 
he forgot about it (‘nassītu l-mawḍūʿ’). The idea that non-Druze quench ‘speaking’ is significant 
insofar as it leaves virtually no room for the idea that taqammuṣ / nuṭq does not exist. If non-
Druze quench the words of their ‘speaking’ children, they are not relegating them to the realm of 
fantasy, but are making go away what must not exist according to their dogma. The contingency 
of one’s own belief is thus mitigated by observing that the others may say that taqammuṣ / nuṭq 
does not exist, but the things they go through and do suggest otherwise. Alternatively, many Druze 
emphasise that ethnic-religious groups, which do not believe in taqammuṣ, do not pay attention 
to the ‘speaking’ of their children; 37 they ‘do not take it seriously.’ It is precisely for this reason 
that the concrete cases are so important where ‘speaking’ children prove in often perplexing ways 
that their claims are true. Not only are they the moments where taqammuṣ becomes ‘palpable and 
real’ for the Druze themselves, but they are also the moments where members of ethnic-religious 
groups whose dogma rejects taqammuṣ or even atheists (mulḥid) ‘cannot deny taqammuṣ 
anymore’ (‘mā ʿandon il-qudra la-yinfū l-mawḍūʿ’), as a young Syrian refugee now studying in 
Germany explained. Concrete cases of ‘speaking’ that unfold in front of their eyes are something 
they (e.g. Christians) have ‘experienced and seen’ (‘ʿāshū hādhā sh-shī wi-shāfūhu’). It seems 
that, when confronted with the experience of concrete cases of nuṭq, the religious others are 
sometimes even forced to re-adjust their own beliefs (or at least admit that an understanding of 
reality other than their own is possible). They may even be forced to say that taqammuṣ is true 
and not just do things that suggest they believe. Statements of our Syrian interview partners 
regarding the ‘quenched’ ‘speaking’ of the children of their Christian neighbours probably 
genuinely reflect a situation of confessional or ethnic-religious plurality. They most certainly suit 
one’s own world-view and thus help take off the edge of the contingency that results from ethnic-
religious plurality. But in contradistinction to fundamentalist or extremist forms of ‘religion’ 
where contingency is sought to be eradicated (see Von Stosch, 2003: 34) it is part of a world 
which, to a certain extent, is shared in common.  
 
Conclusion  
Buttressing internal coherence and suggesting that the world is just, the Druze perception that 
Druze souls migrate according to a divine logic within the limits of their own ethnic-religious 
group seems beneficial. Considering the body only a transient manifestation of a soul, the 
perception that souls transmigrate moreover may encourage a philosophical stance that considers 
the individual body as only a transient manifestation of an eternal soul, from which one best 
disengages, and with regard to which one recognises that it is a mere ‘veil’ that replaced, and will 
be replaced, by other ‘veils.’ It makes sense, however, that such disengagement is more difficult 
the moment people are not reflecting on ‘souls’ and ‘bodies’ in abstract fashion, but the ‘body’ in 
question is a loved human being that belongs specifically to them. Precisely in this context, cases 
of ‘speaking’ are interesting. They certainly corroborate the claim that souls migrate in palpable 
fashion, communicate all sorts of moral lessons, and allow establishing relationships that could 
otherwise not have been established. Nonetheless, a ‘pervasive ambivalence’ (Bennett, 1999: 92) 
that is mirrored in Druze discourse seems to remain with regard to the phenomenon. As a woman 
from Lebanon put it, recalling her own ‘speaking,’ the phenomenon was ‘nice and not so nice at 
the same time’ (‘ḥelu mush ḥelu’) – there always is what ‘lifts the heart and what makes one cry’ 
(Iklimos, 2012).  This ambivalence is interesting because it relativises the Druze dismissal of the 
importance of the body as well as their insistence that death does not really matter and ‘has no 
dominion’ (Maher, 2014) in their communities. On the one hand, ‘speaking’ allows the ‘return’ 
of someone lost to death in different bodily form; on the other hand, not only the need for the 
‘return,’ which mostly seems to occur when unexpected death rips out loved ones “too soon” and 
makes the ugly (bashiʿ) and unjust disappearance of a human being especially difficult to bear,38  
but also the anticipation of difficulties and the efforts of avoiding them through ‘silencing’ 
‘speaking’ children point to the relevance of the singular human beings who the  manifestations 
of a soul de facto are. In the context of ‘speaking,’ there are different, and often beautiful, ways 
for the Druze to handle the social, emotional, and continuing reality of those singular human 
beings. However, all of them engage the notion of a soul that objectively has moved on to a new 
life, yet subjectively still yearns for its former place in the world, from which it had no time to 
disengage, and seems to have its peculiar forms of agency. 
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1 As against other self-referent terms such as Muwaḥḥidūn or Banū maʿrūf, the designation Druze is used 
here because of its sheer prevalence. 
2 Mutaqammiṣ / nāṭiq (masc.) and mutaqammiṣa / nāṭiqa (fem.) in local parlance. 
3 See Bennett (2006); Ṭalīʿ (2001: 19; 113). 
4 See e.g. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XGN-TgQ-0iM (accessed 4 July 2017; min 52:50 ff). 
5 One interview partner told the story about two men A and B. Individual A fathered a child C. B killed A. 
B was killed by someone else and was reborn as D, the son of C. D started to ‘speak,’ resulting in the 
revelation that D killed his grandfather A when he was B. The two families involved could not but admit 
that speaking in terms of ‘them’ and ‘us’ did no longer make any sense. 
                                                          
                                                                                                                                                                          
6 The interviews were conducted by my colleague Gebhard Fartacek and myself as well as by Amjad 
Khabboura.  
7 We were able to talk to parents of ‘speaking’ children in Israel in August 2017. 
8 Druze often claim that the final breath of a dying person is the first breath of the newborn to which the 
soul moves. 
9 This is expressed by the Arabic verb taqammaṣa of which taqammuṣ is the verbal noun. 
10 Albeit denying previous-life memories, the K. an-nuqaṭ wa-d-dawāʾir by Zayn ad-dīn ʿAbdalghaffār (d. 
1557 AD) is an insightful source in respect to transmigration. Systematizing and elaborating on the thoughts 
found in the Rasāʾil al-ḥikma, it not only speculates about how the individual souls come into being, but 
also highlights the idea central to the Druze understanding of taqammuṣ that the soul is always in need of 
a body. Apart from broaching other themes of importance to the wider Druze discourse on taqammuṣ (e.g. 
present suffering of children as proof for previous lives), the work is regularly cited by Druze authors 
because of its intellectual value. For the work, see Firro, 2011. 
11 In the context of the pain caused by having to leave one’s house, compare the analogy between ‘soul’ 
and ‘bride’ (Armanet, 2011: 248). 
12 According to our interview partners, seemingly unmotivated laughing and crying of newborn children is 
best explained by memories of a previous life (see also Armanet, 2011: 152). 
13 Not least, this is reflected in an ascetic ideal that involves a conscious and voluntary detachment from 
the own familial group. As stated by Oppenheimer (1980: 627) in respect to old religious Druze, ‘… since 
it is expected that rebirth will probably be into another patrilineal group, and possibly into a distant village, 
it is appropriate as death draws near that they should disengage themselves from the particular household 
and lineage with which they have been associated in their current lifetime.’ 
14 A remarkable objectification of the membership within these categories is found in a Druze cemetery in 
Pekiin in Galilee where there are two separate chambers for ‘male’ and ‘female’ Druze. For the notion that 
the collective Druze burial chambers generally reflect the unity caused by transmigration, see also 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XdcVuEE6gl8 (accessed 12 October 2017; min 26:25 ff).  
15 The Druze receive newborn children as if they were adults (see Armanet, 2011: 151). 
16 As interview partners stated, they talk to adults ‘as if they were their fathers or mothers;’ they are ‘four 
years old, but behave as if they were thirty.’ 
17 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0_v2Pb9jopo (accessed 19 May 2017; min 35:00 ff.). 
18 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0_v2Pb9jopo (accessed 19 May 2017; min 48:50). 
                                                                                                                                                                          
19 A recurring topos is that children know how to handle a machine (e.g. an airplane) or have knowledge 
of highly specific vocabulary. 
20 Some young Syrian interview partners with tertiary education associated the idea that Druze are reborn 
as Druze with the notion of ‘simplicity’ and ‘lack of education’ (‘in-nās il-busaṭāʾ’); with religious beliefs 
that were not the result of the study of the religious texts, but knowledge from hearsay (‘illī akhadhū d-dīn 
mithl mā samaʿūhu bass’). 
21 There are cases, however (see Laṭīf, 2014: 266–270); see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XGN-
TgQ-0iM (accessed 4 July 2017). 
22 For example, someone who drowned in his or her previous life might be afraid of water, or someone who 
died in a car accident might be afraid of reckless driving (Laṭīf, 2014: 274). As regards predilections, 
interview partners explained, for example, that they were vegetarian or preferred to wear their hair long 
with their previous life. Another interview partner reported about a young man who used to be a farmer in 
his previous life and who still had a penchant for the typical pastimes of farmers from earlier generations 
(‘ando shī min zamān’) instead of engaging in the typical pastimes of his generation (‘football, Facebook’). 
23 For this point, see also Bennett (1999: 10). If ‘speaking’ happens within the same family, according to 
our interview partners, the pair ‘grandfather’ and ‘grandson’ is frequent. 
24 The important issue of proof is beyond the scope of this article (see Nigst, 2017; French, 2017: 90–91). 
25 One of our interview partners had discovered by chance his previous-life house later in his life (having 
‘spoken’ as a child, his ‘speaking’ had not led to the previous-life family). More than once, he approached 
that house and fled as soon as he could have spoken with someone from his previous-life family.  
26 One interview partner told the story of his younger brother who went to the market with his mother and 
suddenly cried out because he spotted his previous-life mother in the crowd. He got out of the car and ran 
towards her. Another interview partner recalled playing outside, when she by chance spotted her previous-
life mother and detected a picture of herself hanging on the wall of her previous-life home.  
27 Our interview partners mentioned that, some people this way stumbled upon their own murderer. 
28 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XGN-TgQ-0iM (accessed 6 June 2017). 
29 For the thematic of singularity, see Boltanski (2013: 29–49). 
30 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XGN-TgQ-0iM (accessed 9 June 2017); min 13:55 ff. 
31 One interview partner from Lebanon told how she brought to light an affair her previous-life father had 
had. 
32 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XGN-TgQ-0iM (accessed 6 June 2017). 
                                                                                                                                                                          
33 See Bennett (1999: 88); Dwairy (2006: 40); see also Laṭīf (2014: 267). The motives for a particular family 
to ‘silence’ a child are not necessarily clear, however. One young interview partner from Syria asked his 
mother later in his life why she did not let him ‘speak’ when he was young. She told him that he said names, 
which were unknown to the family and they had no idea where to look for those people. As the interview 
partner suggests, discussions with his grandmother, on the other hand, insinuated that his mother was not 
entirely honest and that the previous-life family indeed may have been known. 
34 Considering that the initial contact with the previous life often occurs ‘by chance,’ some interview 
partners ruled out the possibility of making a child forget the previous life for good because incidental 
contact with previous-life things or people would instantly trigger the memories. For example, one 
interview partner who was ‘silenced’ by his parents in his childhood, at a later point in his life listened to a 
tape with music that instantly transported him back to his old life when he instantly knew that there was 
something ‘missing.’ Other interview partners were more optimistic in regards to the possibility of making 
a child to forget for good. 
35 The point is unclear, but people occasionally indicate that children are ‘talked into’ memories, and that 
there are parents who actively help the child in ‘speaking.’ 
36 I am thankful to Jim Tucker (University of Virginia, School of Medicine) for the information that out of 
the 151 Lebanese reincarnation-cases in the database of his research institution, 19 concern non-Druze 
individuals. (Email, 15 November 2016). 
37 For a case involving a Christian Lebanese girl where the family’s rejection of the belief in taqammuṣ led 
them to not being responsive to their daughter’s memories, see Laṭīf (2014: 267). Similarly, one Christian 
interview partner in Lebanon stated that Christians did not believe in taqammuṣ and thus paid no attention 
to the ‘speaking’ of their children. 
38 The unnatural death (‘mush ṭabīʿī’) in question cannot be considered to be replicating a prototype (i.e. 
the ‘natural’ death) and does not constitute part of the types of death with which are to be ‘reckoned’ (see 
Bloch and Parry 1982: 15; Rivoal 2000: 350–355). 
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